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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Appellant/Petitioner, : 
v. : 
DONALD L. JAEGER, : Case No. 
Court of Appeals 910132-CA 
Appellee/Respondent. : Priority No. 13 
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The question presented for review in point 2 of the 
State's Petition is whether the Court of Appeals properly concluded 
that it did not have jurisdiction to review the magistrate's refusal 
to bind over this case based on this Court's decision in State v. 
Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991). 
Response: The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that it 
did not have jurisdiction to review the magistrate's refusal to bind 
over the case. A magistrate does not adjudicate nor issue a final 
appealable order when he or she presides over a preliminary 
hearing. In addition, the State does not have statutory 
authorization for such an appeal. 
2. The first question presented for review by the State 
is whether the Court of Appeals effectively denied the State an 
avenue for review of the magistrate's order denying bindover. A 
related issue addressed by the State in this first question is 
whether the Court of Appeals determined the method for review of a 
magistrate's dismissal where the State believes that it does not 
have adequate evidence to refile the case pursuant to State v. 
Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986), thereby deciding an 
important issue of state law which should be decided by this Court. 
Response: This Court should deny certiorari since the 
Court of Appeals correctly applied statutes and case law from this 
Court in reaching its decision that it did not have jurisdiction 
over the State's appeal of the magistrate's refusal to bind over the 
case. Regardless of whether the State has historically had a right 
to review of a magistrate's refusal to bind over a charge, the 
current statutory scheme does not provide for appellate review. The 
State offers no current analysis which would support appellate 
review of a magistrate's decision; nor does it suggest what 
procedures might be appropriate. An erroneous decision is the 
proper basis for certiorari; outlining for the State the procedure 
it could utilize in this case is not an appropriate basis for a writ 
of certiorari. 
3. The third issue presented by the State is whether this 
Court should grant certiorari based on the failure of the Court of 
Appeals to address the merits of the case and outline the 
appropriate standard to be utilized in assessing whether to bind 
over a charge. 
Response; Because the State does not have the power to 
appeal the magistrate's determination and the Court of Appeals did 
not have jurisdiction to review such determination, it would be 
inappropriate to address the merits of the State's argument. In 
addition, since the magistrate utilized the proper standard in 
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reaching his determination that the State had not established 
probable cause to believe Appellee had committed a crime, a writ of 
certiorari should not be granted in this case. 
4. The fourth issue presented for review by the State is 
whether the Court of Appeals followed the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure in issuing a per curiam unpublished opinion in this case. 
Response; The Court of Appeals followed the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure in this case; this is not an appropriate basis 
for a writ of certiorari. 
OPINION BELOW 
The amended opinion of the Court of Appeals was issued on 
January 7, 1992. A copy of State v. Jaeger, Case No. 910132-CA 
(Utah App. January 7, 1992) is contained in Addendum A. The opinion 
is not published. 
The State did not file a petition for rehearing in the 
Court of Appeals. 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of relevant constitutional provisions, statutes 
and rules is set forth in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In an Information dated November 1, 1990, the State charged 
Donald Jaeger, Defendant/Appellee/Respondent with Criminal Homicide, 
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Murder in the Second Degree, a first degree felony, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990). R. 1-2. 
On January 9, 1991, the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings, 
acting as a magistrate pursuant to Rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (1991), conducted a preliminary hearing in the present 
case. R. 17-19. After taking the matter under advisement, the 
magistrate issued a Memorandum Decision on February 1, 1991, in 
which he refused to bind over the case for trial. R. 18-20; see 
Addendum C for copy of magistrate's Memorandum Decision. 
On February 6, 1991, the magistrate dismissed the charges 
against Mr. Jaeger. R. 39-40. As of the date of this brief, the 
State has not attempted to refile the charge pursuant to Rule 7, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
On February 28, 1991, the State filed its notice of appeal, 
designating the Utah Supreme Court as the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over this matter. R. 44. On March 8, 1991, this Court 
informed the Attorney General's office that the appeal in the 
instant case had been filed in the Court of Appeals. R. 46. 
Thereafter, on March 20, 1991, the State informed this Court that it 
believed that the case belonged in the Court of Appeals. R. 48. 
On December 18, 1991, after both parties had filed briefs 
in the Court of Appeals, this Court issued its opinion in State v. 
Humphrey, et ah. 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991). On December 20, 1991, 
Appellee filed a letter of supplemental authority in the Court of 
Appeals citing Humphrey in support of his argument contained in 
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Point I of his brief that the Court of Appeals did not have 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
On December 20, 1991, Appellee also filed a motion, which 
was stipulated to by the State, for supplemental briefing in light 
of this Court's decision in State v. Humphrey. That stipulated 
motion also requested that oral argument be stricken until after 
such supplemental briefing occurred. 
On January 3, 1992, the Court of Appeals issued its 
per curiam decision dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. 
The opinion indicated that oral argument was stricken and remanded 
the case to the district court. Four days later, the Court of 
Appeals issued an amended opinion remanding the case to the circuit 
court. A copy of this amended opinion is in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts of the incident are not relevant since the Court 
of Appeals held that it did not have jurisdiction over this appeal 
by the State. 
However, in the event this Court disagrees, and for the 
purposes of this Opposition to the State's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, the Statement of Facts contained in the magistrate's 
Memorandum Decision is adequate. See Memorandum Decision at R. 21-7 
contained in Addendum C. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT OF APPEALS FOLLOWED CASE IAW 
FROM THIS COURT AND CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT IT DID 
NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THIS APPEAL. 
In State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991), this Court 
held that district courts, not appellate courts, have jurisdiction 
over a criminal defendant's motion to quash a magistrate's 
bindover. In reaching that decision, this Court relied on the 
distinction between courts of record, circuit courts, and 
magistrates, and pointed out that "magistrates are not courts of 
record when they conduct preliminary hearings and issue bindover 
orders" and "their orders are not immediately appealable." Id. at 
468. 
This Court stated: 
Magistrates are not courts or tribunals. They 
exercise magisterial, not adjudicatory, 
functions. Review of their orders cannot 
properly be subjected to appellate review under 
our statutory scheme. 
Id. at 468 (emphasis added). 
The Court of Appeals properly relied on this analysis in 
Humphrey that magistrates do not adjudicate final appealable orders 
after a preliminary hearing in reaching its decision that it did not 
have jurisdiction to review Judge Hutchings# refusal to bind over 
the case. 
A review of Utah statutes and Rules of Criminal Procedure 
also supports the determination that the State cannot appeal a 
magistrate's refusal to bind over a criminal defendant. Utah Code 
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Ann. § 77-18a-l(2) (Supp. 1991)1 lists the circumstances under which 
the State can appeal. 
It is well established that § 77-18a-l(2) creates "a narrow 
category of cases in which the prosecution may appeal" and that the 
circumstances under which the State can appeal are strictly 
limited. See State v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233, 1234 (Utah App. 1990); 
State v. Waddoups, 712 P.2d 223, 224 (Utah 1985); Hartman v. 
Weggeland, 429 P.2d 978 (Utah 1967); State v. Kelbach. 569 P.2d 
1100, 1101 (Utah 1977); State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061, 1065 
(Utah 1983); State v. Workman. 806 P.2d 1198, 1201-2 (Utah App. 
1991) . 
In its opening brief in the Court of Appeals, the State 
relied only on Rule 26(3)(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure as 
creating for the State the ability to appeal in this case. That 
provision is identical to § 77-18a-l(2)(a), and provides that the 
State can appeal from a "final judgment of dismissal."2 
A dismissal following a refusal to bind over a defendant 
for trial is not a "final judgment of dismissal" since it is not a 
final appealable order and the State can refile the Information 
pursuant to Rule 7(8)(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 
State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986)("[A]n accused is not 
placed in jeopardy at [a preliminary hearing], and the double 
1. Aside from punctuation, § 77-18a-l(2) is identical to 
Rule 26(3), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1991). 
2. The State does not suggest any other statutory basis for its 
ability to appeal in its petition for writ of certiorari. 
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jeopardy provisions of the federal and state constitutions do not 
apply."); State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 468 (magistrate does not 
adjudicate and does not issue final appealable order after 
preliminary hearing). 
In addition, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3 and 78-2-2 (Supp. 
1991), which delineate the jurisdiction of this Court and the Court 
of Appeals, buttress Mr. Jaeger's position that an appeal is not 
appropriate in this case. In its opening brief, the State relied on 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(d) in providing jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals. 
That subsection gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction over 
"appeals from circuit courts . . . ." However, Humphrey clarifies 
that a magistrate presiding over a preliminary hearing is not a 
"circuit court." Furthermore, reliance on this provision for 
jurisdiction would create inconsistent appellate jurisdiction for 
the same charge based on whether a justice of the peace or circuit, 
district or appellate court judge were acting as magistrate. 
In its petition for writ of certiorari, the State also 
refers, without any analysis, to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), 
which is a catchall provision which provides jurisdiction to this 
Court over "orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record 
over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction." State v. Humphrey also clarifies that a magistrate 
presiding over a preliminary hearing is not a "court of record," so 
this section fails to provide jurisdiction to this Court. 
The lack of any provision in § 78-2-2 or § 78-2a-3 
providing jurisdiction to an appellate court over an appeal from a 
8 
magistrate's dismissal further demonstrates that the decision of the 
Court of Appeals that it did not have jurisdiction over the case was 
proper. 
Because the decision of the Court of Appeals was proper and 
the State has provided this Court with no arguable basis for 
creating a right to appeal or delineating jurisdiction of such an 
appeal in either appellate court, this Court should deny the State's 
petition for writ of certiorari. 
POINT II. THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS NOT REQUIRED 
TO INFORM THE STATE AS TO HOW TO PROCEED IN THIS 
CASE; CLARIFYING AVAILABLE PROCEDURE FOR THE 
STATE IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE BASIS FOR A WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI. 
Although the State claims a historical right to review of a 
magistrate's refusal to bind a case over for trial, it fails to 
point to any current statutes which create such a right. 
A historical right is meaningless in the absence of statutes or 
rules of procedure which allow the State to take an appeal. 
In addition, it is not clear that a historical right to 
appeal a magistrate's refusal to bind over a defendant existed. 
Former section 77-39-4 permitted the State to appeal from a 
"judgment of dismissal." While a State could appeal a district 
court judge's order granting a motion to quash, such an appeal is 
distinct from an appeal of a magistrate's refusal to bind over. 
While case law from other jurisdictions may be informative, 
it does not provide the State with the basis for an appeal in the 
absence of any statutory provisions authorizing an appeal. Most of 
- 9 -
the cases cited by the State at 10-12 of its petition for writ of 
certiorari involve a distinct statutory scheme from that in Utah. 
See, e.g.. People v. Mimms. 251 Cal. Rptr. 672, 673 (Cal. App. 5 
Dist. 1988)(statute explicitly authorizes state to appeal from 
dismissal where jeopardy has not attached); State v. Antes, 246 
N.W. 2d 671 (Wis. 1976)(statute authorizes state to appeal dismissal 
where jeopardy has not attached); State ex. rel. Fallis v. Caldwell. 
498 P.2d 426 (Okl. Cr. 1972)(court recognizes that statutes and 
rules do not allow state to appeal and adopts prospective rule 
allowing state to appeal from magistrate's adverse ruling); State v. 
Zimmerman. 660 P.2d 960, 962 (Kan. 1983)(district court presides 
over preliminary hearing; statute explicitly authorizes appeal from 
an order dismissing information); State v. Fry. 385 N.W.2d 196 (Wis. 
App. 1985)(circuit court hears preliminary hearing; court allows 
state to appeal without any statutory analysis). 
Other cases cited by the State on pages 10-12 of its 
petition discuss the appropriateness of refiling, allow a review 
other than an appeal to an appellate court, or simply do not allow 
the State to a review of the refusal to bind over. State v. Ruiz. 
678 P.2d 1109 (Idaho 1984)(no appeal allowed); Walker v. Schneider. 
477 N.W.2d 167, 174-5 (N.D. 1991)(following adverse ruling on 
probable cause at preliminary hearing, state may "(1) seek district 
court review of a magistrate's adverse ruling on probable cause, 
[footnote omitted] or (2) issue a new complaint upon the offer of 
additional evidence or good cause[]" (emphasis added); People v. 
Nevitt, 256 N.W.2d 612, 613 (Mich. App. 1977)(prosecutor refiled 
- 10 -
after dismissal and defendant bound over; court says better practice 
would have been to "appeal to the circuit court." (emphasis added). 
The remainder of the cases cited by the State on pages 
10-12 of its petition involve distinct circumstances from those in 
the present case. See, e.g., Comm. v. Finn, 496 A.2d 1254, 1255 
(Pa. Super. 1985)(dismissal was final appealable order because 
statute of limitations had run and state could not refile); Comm. v. 
Prado, 393 A.2d 8, 10 (Pa. 1978)(although state usually cannot 
appeal discharge after preliminary hearing, where only judge 
empowered to do so refused to grant petition for rearrest, appeal by 
state of orders discharging defendant and refusal to rearrest 
proper). 
Other jurisdictions have held that under their statutory 
schemes, the decision of the magistrate to dismiss the information 
is not a final order from which the state can appeal. See, e.g., 
State v. Maki, 192 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. 1971)(no appellate review; 
,f[a]n appellate court should not be required to review the issue of 
probable cause in every preliminary examination before the 
magistrate . . . " ) ; State v. Fahey, 275 N.W 2d 870 (S.D. 1979) 
(preliminary hearing is not final adjudication). 
While it is understandable that the State might desire 
further guidance at this juncture, the Court of Appeals was not 
required to outline available procedure for the State, especially in 
a case such as this, where it did not have jurisdiction over an 
appeal. The State has failed to offer this Court any suggestions as 
to which statutes might control or which avenues of review might be 
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available. Instead, the State has claimed only that a historical 
right to review existed and cited to cases from other jurisdictions 
which rely on their own statutes and rules to create either a right 
to refile, district court review, appellate review, or no review at 
all. 
Given that the decision of the Court of Appeals was 
mandated by this Court's decision in Humphrey and the State has 
offered no statutory, rule or case law basis for a different 
decision, certiorari is not appropriate in this case. 
POINT III. ALTHOUGH THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW 
THE MERITS OF THIS CASE. EVEN IF IT DID. IT WOULD 
FIND THAT THE MAGISTRATE UTILIZED THE PROPER 
STANDARD IN DETERMINING THAT PROBABLE CAUSE DID 
NOT EXIST. 
As set forth in Point I, supra. the Court of Appeals 
properly held that it did not have jurisdiction over this appeal? 
therefore, it would be improper for the Court of Appeals or this 
Court to explore the merits of the State's argument. 
However, in the event this Court determines otherwise, it 
is nevertheless appropriate to deny a writ of certiorari since the 
magistrate applied the proper standard in determining that there was 
not probable cause to bind Mr. Jaeger over for trial. 
Although the State would like the standard at a preliminary 
hearing to be that the magistrate look at the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the State and not assess the credibility of the 
witnesses or make factual findings, such a position disregards 
Rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. It also disregards the 
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important role of a preliminary hearing in Utah# as reflected in 
Article 1, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution and case law, and the 
purpose and function of a preliminary hearing in Utah, as set forth 
in State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980). 
Rule 7 requires that the magistrate make factual findings, 
allows cross-examination of the witnesses, and allows the defendant 
to testify and call witnesses. The provisions of the rule would be 
meaningless if the State's position were adopted. 
Article I, Section 13 of the Utah constitution and various 
cases emphasize the importance of a preliminary hearing in Utah. 
See State v. Pay, 146 P. 300, 305 (Utah 1915)(the right to a 
preliminary hearing in Utah is a "substantial one"); State v. 
Ortega, 751 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Utah 1988)(importance of preliminary 
hearing and its purposes "have made up the fabric of our law for 
over three-quarters of a century"); State v. Jensen, 96 P. 1085, 
1086 (Utah 1908). 
State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d at 786, acknowledges the 
critical and important character of preliminary hearings in this 
state, recognizing that the right to confrontation exists at such 
hearings. This Court stated in Anderson, "the credibility of the 
witnesses is an important element in the determination of probable 
cause." Id. 
In Anderson, this Court relied on Mvers v. Commonwealth, 
363 Mass. 843, 29 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 1973) in reaching its decision. 
In Myers
 f the court pointed out that cross-examination "may expose 
fatal weaknesses in the State's case that may lead the magistrate to 
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refuse to bind the accused over." Id. at 822-3. The Myers court 
also pointed out that the credibility of the witnesses is a factual 
assessment to be made by the magistrate, that lf[t]he magistrate is 
not bound to believe even uncontradicted testimony of a particular 
witness, and that the magistrate can assess the quality of the 
evidence in addition to determining the credibility of the 
witnesses." Id. at 825. 
The probable cause showing required at a preliminary 
hearing is greater than the probable cause determination which is 
required for an arrest warrant, and requires at the very least that 
the state "establish a prima facie case against the defendant from 
which the trier of fact could conclude the defendant was guilty of 
the offense as charged. [footnote omitted]." State v. Anderson, 
612 P.2d at 783.3 
Although the magistrates thorough Memorandum Decision 
speaks best for itself (see Addendum C), a brief overview may help 
this Court in determining that the proper standard was utilized. 
The magistrate essentially made the following findings: (a) the 
gunshot residue (GSR) evidence was not reliable so as to link Don to 
the firing of the gun (Memorandum Decision 29-30) , (b) the GSR tests 
were not reliable so as to establish sufficient cause to believe 
Mary did not fire the gun (Memorandum Decision at 31-2), and (c) the 
3. In State v. Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Utah App. 1992), this 
Court applied a standard similar to that utilized by the magistrate 
in the instant case, and held that the State had not established a 
prima facie case against the defendant. In order to establish a 
prima facie case, the State must produce "believable evidence of all 
the elements of the crime charged." State v. Emmett. slip op. at 3. 
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remaining evidence did not establish sufficient cause to believe a 
crime had been committed. 
These findings are supported by the evidence and are not 
clearly erroneous. The magistrate also made subsidiary findings in 
regard to his finding that the evidence was not reliable so as to 
establish sufficient cause to believe Mary did not fire the gun. 
These subsidiary findings included: 
a. not all of the particles taken from 
Mary's hands were analyzed (R. 30), 
b. lack of gunshot residue is not conclusive 
that Mary did not fire gun (R. 31), 
c. Any GSR on Mary's hands may well have 
rubbed off by bags or medical personnel. (R. 31) 
d. Had Mary fired the gun, it would not 
have exuded a sufficient amount of GSR on her 
hands to be detectable. (R. 31) 
These subsidiary findings are supported by the evidence in 
this case and are not clearly erroneous. 
The magistrate assessed the quality of the State's 
evidence, including the 911 tape recording and testimony of 
witnesses, and determined that there was not sufficient cause to 
believe a homicide had been committed in this case. He issued a 
thorough and well considered memorandum outlining the basis for his 
decision. This type of thorough reasoned approach to the issue of 
whether to bind a defendant over for trial should be encouraged by 
this Court. 
Because this Court does not have jurisdiction over an 
appeal by the State in this case and based on the magistrate's 
thorough and correct application of the proper standard, this Court 
should deny certiorari on this issue. 
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POINT IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS FOLLOWED 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
Although the State maintains that this Court should review 
this case because the Court of Appeals failed to follow the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, a review of those rules indicates otherwise. 
The State claims that Rule 10, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure "contemplates that summary reversal of a case should only 
be invoked when the parties have had an opportunity to respond to 
such a drastic procedure." State's brief at 19. However, the 
State's claim that, under the rules, it was entitled to notice and 
an opportunity to respond fails for several reasons. 
First, the Court of Appeals did not summarily reverse a 
case. Instead, it determined that it did not have jurisdiction, 
which resulted in the magistrate's ruling being undisturbed. 
Second, Rule 10(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows 
an appellate court to dismiss an appeal for lack of jurisdiction 
"upon its own motion, and on such notice as it directs." This 
language suggests that notice and an opportunity to respond is 
within the discretion of the appellate court. 
Third, Rule 2, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure allows the 
appellate court to suspend the rules "[i]n the interest of 
expediting a decision." Even if Rule 10 required that the parties 
be given notice and an opportunity to respond to a court's 
sua sponte motion for summary disposition, that provision could be 
properly suspended under Rule 2. 
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In this case, Appellee argued that the State did not have 
the ability to appeal the magistrate's ruling in Point I of his 
brief in the Court of Appeals. The State was therefore aware that 
jurisdiction was at issue in this case. After this Court issued its 
opinion in Humphrey, Appellee cited that decision as supplemental 
authority in support of his argument that the Court of Appeals did 
not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal and requested the 
opportunity for further briefing in light of Humphrey. 
Unusual circumstances existed in this case where a decision 
of this Court, which directly impacted on the Court of Appeals 
determination of jurisdiction and overruled an existing Court of 
Appeals decision, was issued after parties had filed their briefs. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeals followed 
the Rules of Appellate Procedure and expedited a decision which was 
mandated by this Court's decision in Humphrey.4 
The State also expresses concern about the use of an 
unpublished per curiam decision. An appellate court has the 
discretion to utilize per curiam decisions. In the past, this Court 
has issued per curiam opinions, even in areas where it was breaking 
new ground. See, e.g., State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987). 
The appellate court also has the discretion as to whether 
to publish an opinion. While a published opinion might have been 
helpful to practitioners, especially criminal defense lawyers who 
4. It should be noted that the State has no constitutional right to 
appeal, and its statutory right to appeal is strictly limited. See 
discussion supra at 7-8. Hence, the State does not have an argument 
that its "rights" were violated by this procedure. 
- 17 -
might be faced with defending an appeal by the State from a 
magistrate's dismissal, the holding of the Jaeger decision is 
apparent from a reading of Humphrey which clarifies that magistrates 
do not issue final appealable orders. 
The Court of Appeals was not required to publish this 
opinion, and the procedure utilized by the Court of Appeals should 
not be a basis for granting a writ of certiorari in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee/Respondent Donald Jaeger respectfully requests 
that this Court deny the State's petition for writ of certiorari on 
all issues. 
SUBMITTED this lfr&> day of May, 1992. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA jjREMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
RICHARD MAURO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 and four copies to the Attorney 
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AMENDED* 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 910132-CA 
F I L E D 
(January 7, 1992) 
Third Circuit, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Michael L. Hutchings 
Attorneys: R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
Joan C. Watt, Lisa J. Remal, and Richard P. Mauro, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Russon, Bench, and Greenwood (Law & Motion). 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on appellee's motion and 
stipulation for supplemental briefing and to strike oral 
argument. 
Defendant was charged with second degree murder and a 
preliminary hearing was held. The court dismissed the 
information on the ground that the State failed to establish 
probable cause to bind over defendant to district court for 
trial. The State appeals. 
In State v. Humphrey, No. 900434 (Utah December 18, 1991), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that jurisdiction to review bindover 
orders rests with the district court, not with the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The court stated that when a bindover order is issued, 
the circuit court judge, acting as a magistrate, determines 
whether there is sufficient evidence to bind defendant over for 
trial. If so, the information is then transferred to the 
*This replaces the memorandum decision issued on January 3, 1992. 
district court permitting that court to take original 
jurisdiction of the matter- The district court then "has the 
inherent authority and the obligation to determine whether its 
original jurisdiction has been properly invoked." id. Further, 
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure gives the 
district courts authority to review defects in the indictment or 
information. 
In this case, the State appeals from the circuit court's 
dismissal of an information, alleging defendant should have been 
bound over to district court for trial. In accordance with 
Humphrey. we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and 
remand to the circuit court. Because we dismiss the appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction, oral argument is stricken and the motion 
for supplemental briefing is deemed moot. 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
Russel^W. Bench, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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ADDENDUM B 
TEXT OF STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or 
indictment—Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be 
prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by 
information after examination and commitment by a 
magistrate, unless the examination be waived by 
the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and 
commitment. The formation of the grand jury and 
the powers and duties thereof shall be as 
prescribed by the Legislature. (As amended 
November 2, 1948, effective January 1, 1949.) 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-18a-l(2) (Supp. 1991) provides in 
pertinent part: 
77-l8a-l. Appeals—when proper. 
(2) an appeal may be taken by the 
prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the 
prosecution because of a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a 
statute or any part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a 
pretrial motion to suppress evidence when 
upon a petition for review the appellate 
court decides that the appeal would be in 
the interest of justice; or 
(f) an order of the court granting a 
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or 
no contest. 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2 (Supp. 1991) provides: 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original 
jurisdiction to answer questions of state law 
certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original 
jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
authority to issue all writs and process 
necessary to carry into effect its orders, 
judgments, and decrees or in aid of its 
jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme 
Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final 
judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial 
Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal 
adjudicative proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and 
Forestry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and 
Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the 
district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under 
Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any 
court of record holding a statute of the 
United States or this state unconstitutional 
on its face under the Constitution of the 
United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any 
court of record involving a charge of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court 
involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of 
any court of record over which the Court of 
Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the 
Court of Appeals any of the matters over which 
the Supreme Court has original appellate 
j urisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an 
appeal of an interlocutory order of a court 
of record involving a charge of a capital 
felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election 
districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public 
officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in 
Subsection (3)(a) through (f). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion 
in granting or denying a petition for writ of 
certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals 
adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review 
those cases certified to it by the Court of 
Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the 
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its 
review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1991) provides: 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all 
writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, 
orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees 
resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals 
from the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, 
except the Public Service Commission, State 
Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board 
of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state 
engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court 
review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action 
under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, 
except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any 
court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a charge of a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction of a first degree or capital 
felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions 
for extraordinary writs sought by persons 
who are incarcerated or serving any other 
criminal sentence, except petitions 
constituting a challenge to a conviction of 
or the sentence for a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court 
involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, 
annulment, property division, child custody, 
support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military 
Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of 
Appeals from the Supreme Court, 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own 
motion only and by the vote of four judges of the 
court may certify to the Supreme Court for 
original appellate review and determination any 
matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with 
the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its 
review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1991) provides: 
Rule 7. Proceedings before magistrate. 
(8) (a) A preliminary examination shall be 
held under the rules and laws applicable to 
criminal cases tried before a court. The 
state has the burden of proof and shall 
proceed first with its case. At the 
conclusion of the state's case, the 
defendant may testify under oath, call 
witnesses, and present evidence. The 
defendant may also cross-examine the 
witnesses against him. 
(b) If from the evidence a magistrate 
finds probable cause to believe that the 
crime charged has been committed and that 
the defendant has committed it, the 
magistrate shall order in writing, that the 
defendant be bound over to answer in the 
district court. The findings of probable 
cause may be based on hearsay in whole or in 
part. Objections to evidence on the ground 
that it was acquired by unlawful means are 
not properly raised at the preliminary 
examination. 
(c) If the magistrate does not find 
probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed or that the 
defendant committed it, the magistrate shall 
dismiss the information and discharge the 
defendant. The magistrate may enter 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an 
order of dismissal. The dismissal and 
discharge do not preclude the state from 
instituting a subsequent prosecution for the 
same offense. 
Rule 26, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1991) provides: 
Rule 26. Appeals. 
(1) An appeal is taken by filing with the 
clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken 
a notice of appeal, stating the order or judgment 
appealed from, and by serving a copy of it on the 
adverse party or his attorney of record. Proof 
of service of the copy shall be filed with the 
court. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant 
from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, 
whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made, after judgment, 
affecting the substantial rights of the 
defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon 
petition for review, the appellate court 
decides that the appeal would be in the 
interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the 
defendant by reason of a mental disease or 
defect incompetent to proceed further in a 
pending prosecution. 
(3) An appeal may be taken by the 
prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the 
prosecution because of a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a 
statute or any part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a 
pretrial motion to suppress evidence when, 
upon a petition for review, the appellate 
court decides that the appeal would be in 
the interest of justice; or 
(f) an order of the court granting a 
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or 
no contest. 
ADDENDUM C 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
DONALD L. JAEGER, 
Plaintiff, ; 
Defendant. ] 
> MEMORANDUM DECISION 
| Case No. 901012471 FS 
| JUDGE MICHAEL L. HUTCHINGS 
On January 9, 1991 at the hour of 2:00 p.m. the court, Judge 
Michael L. Hutchings presiding, heard evidence presented by the 
State and also by the defense in the above entitled case. The 
defendant, Donald L. Jaeger, is charged with criminal homicide, 
murder in the second degree, a first degree felony which allegedly 
occurred at 6495 South Scranton Drive in Salt Lake County. On the 
date of August 22, 1990. The State was represented by Ernie Jones 
and Kim Hornack. The defense was represented by Lisa Remal and 
Richard Mauro. The court commends counsel for the defense and 
the prosecution for the manner in which the evidence at the 
preliminary hearing was presented. 
The court has taken the case under advisement and now issues 
its Memorandum Decision. 
The court will state the question presented, a summary of the 
facts presented at the preliminary hearing, cite the legal 
standard to be applied at a preliminary hearing, analyze the facts 
with the law and announce it's decision in this Memorandum Decision 
QUESTION 
Did the defendant, Donald Jaeger, inflict the fatal gunshot 
wound that caused the death of Mary Barndt? 
FACTS 
Mary Barndt was a 19 year old female, living with the 
defendant, Donald Jaeger, at 6495 South Scranton Drive in West 
Jordan, Utah. On August 22, 1990, the defendant, Donald Jaeger, 
arrived from work at the residence at 7:30 p.m. Mary was not 
home. The defendant opened some mail that had been delivered in 
the mail box and discovered a telephone bill with some long 
distance phone calls. He suspected that Mary had made some 
unauthorized phone calls. The defendant called the phone numbers 
to find out the purpose of the phone calls and to verify who had 
made them. 
The defendant also found Mary's young daughter, Alicia, home 
unsupervised. The defendant attempted to determine where Mary 
might be located. He called, at least twice, Maryfs mother, Judy 
Clark. During one of the conversations, Judy Clark was informed 
that Mary "was heavy into drugs." Judy Clark did not know Maryfs 
whereabouts. 
Later in the evening, Mary contacted the defendant by 
telephone. The defendant did not know where Mary was when she 
called but he could hear some music in the background. He assumed 
that she had called from a bar or a party. 
At approximately 12:00 midnight, Mary came home. The 
defendant was awakened when Mary came to bed. At that time, the 
defendant told her that his relationship with her was terminated 
and that she should move out of the home the next day. 
The defendant made another telephone call to Judy Clark. The 
defendant first spoke with Judy Clark and indicated that Mary 
would like to speak with her. Ms. Clark thereupon spoke with 
Mary. Mary was crying and despondent. Mary stated that Don had 
asked her to leave the home and that the relationship was over. 
She stated "Don hates me...yes he does, he hates me." She made 
these statements approximately six times. She also said, her 
employment situation was not good. Finally she said, "I feel that 
I need to get away from things and work things out." 
The defendant indicated in conversations with the police 
officers that he went back to sleep and was awakened by the 
discharge of a firearm. He immediately rushed into the kitchen 
whereupon he saw Mary lying on her back. The firearm was on the 
floor between her legs near her ankles. Mary had sustained a 
gunshot wound in her lower left neck near the collarbone. 
The defendant called 911 emergency and spoke with the 911 
operator for the city of West Jordan. Near the beginning of his 
911 conversation he stated, "Oh,...1.•.1...my girlfriend just shot 
herself." He also stated during this conversation, "Oh, God I 
can't believe she done this." (sic.) "What can I do to help her?", 
"I can't calm down but my girlfriend just shot herself.", "I love 
you, I love you Mary.. .breath.. .breath.. .Baby, come on." and also 
in speaking directly to her, "How could you do this?" During the 
911 conversation, the operator told him, among other things, to 
hold the hand of Mary Barndt and also told him to turn Mary Barndt 
on her side. 
Officer B. Sundquist, from the West Jordan Police Department, 
was first to arrive on the scene. When he entered the residence, 
he noticed Mary on her back on the kitchen floor with the gun at 
her feet. The barrel was pointed towards Mary Barndt. One bullet 
had been shot from the .22 caliber automatic pistol. One expended 
cartridge was lying on the ground between Mary Barndt's legs near 
her ankles. Officer Sundquist noticed some of Mary's upper 
clothing near her side on the floor. Officer Sundquist noticed 
no evidence of disruption in the house. He immediately put two 
small brown paper bags over Mary's two hands and taped them. His 
purpose in doing so was to preserve any gun shot residue which may 
possibly of been on her hands. Paramedics arrived and took Mary 
out of the residence to be transported to the hospital. Her arms 
were moving about as she was taken down the stairs of the split 
level home. 
Officer Sundquist performed a gun shot residue test at the 
hospital at approximately 1:45 p.m. The scene was hectic. Many 
medical personnel were working to preserve Mary's life. Mary's 
left breast was cut, chest tubes were placed within her, I.V.fs 
were administered and she was given many medical treatments. The 
bags which were placed over Mary's hands were removed by the law 
enforcement officers and were never preserved. Therefore no tests 
were performed on the inside of the bags to ascertain the presence 
of gun shot residue. 
Officer Sundquist performed a gunshot residue test on Mary's 
left hand. He had never performed a gunshot residue test before. 
Officer Peterson performed a gunshot residue test on Mary's right 
hand. Officer Vernon Peterson had performed three or four prior 
gunshot residue tests on various occasions before this particular 
test. 
Officer Vernon Peterson also conducted gunshot residue tests 
on both hands of the defendant. He performed the gunshot residue 
test between 1:22 a.m. to 1:27 a.m. He noticed blood on the hands 
of Donald Jaeger. Donald Jaeger also indicated that he had 
touched Mary's gunshot wound. 
Later, Judy Clark was informed that her daughter had died. 
Her first comment was to ask if Mary had taken her own life. 
Dr. Edward A. Leis, the Assistant State Medical Examiner, 
testified that when the shot entered Mary's body, her left arm was 
raised at least to shoulder height. He formed this opinion 
because of the passage way created by the bullet as it went 
through the muscle and bone of Mary's left lower neck. He 
indicated the gunshot wound was clearly within the reach of Mary's 
arms. He determined that the barrel of the gun was approximately 
nine inches away from Mary when the fatal shot was fired. The 
firearm was also positioned near Mary's right breast and was fired 
into her upper left collarbone area of her lower left neck. A 
mannequin was introduced into * evidence to demonstrate the location 
of the fatal wound, the distance of the gun from the wound (a nine 
inch yellow tape was attached to the mannequin), the trajectory of 
the fatal shot and Mary's left arm raised at the time the fatal 
shot was fired. 
Dr. Leis also indicated that blood was found on Mary's hands 
when she was brought into the State Medical Examiner's office. 
Blood alcohol and drug screen tests were also conducted at 
the State Medical Examiner's office. At the time of death, Mary 
had between .10 and .12 percent alcohol in her system. A drug 
screen test also indicated the presence of Valium (diazapam) and 
the metabolite of Valium. Dr. Leis indicated this drug and its 
coflibination with alcohol would cause someone to be tired and slow 
and that Valium would heighten the effect of the alcohol. 
Dr. Leis also indicated that the arm length of the victim was 
26 1/2 inches and that it would be extremely unlikely that she 
would have been able to shoot herself by holding the handgun by 
the right hand with her right index finger on the trigger. He 
also indicated, however, that it would have been possible for Mary 
to self inflict a gunshot by holding the gun facing her left 
upperchest with her right hand and pulling the trigger with her 
right thumb. 
Dr. Leis expressed the opinion that Mary did not self-inflict 
the gunshot. He based the opinion on the facts of her left arm 
being raised, gunshot residue test results on her hands, the 
atypical entrance wound, the distance of the firearm from Mary's 
body and angle of fire. 
Kevin Smith, a criminologist working for the State Crime Lab, 
testified. He stated he tested the gunshot residue tests 
performed on both Mary Barndt's hands and found no gunshot residue 
on either test. He stated that it was possible that Mary had 
gunshot residue on her hands because he did not analyze all of the 
particles submitted to him on the test discs. He also stated that 
a lack of gunshot residue should not be conclusive that Mary did 
not fire the gun. 
He also tes-^fied that he analyzed gunshot residue test 
samples taken from both hands of Donald Jaeger. He indicated that 
he found particles "characteristic" of gunshot residue on both 
samples. He testified that there are three particles he is 
looking for when performing a gunshot residue test. These three 
particles are: lead, barium, and antimony. He indicated that he 
would look for spherical particles containing lead, plus the 
substance of barium or the substance of antimony. In the tests 
conducted on the samples taken from Donald Jaeger's hands, he 
found only two elements. His conclusion was that he found 
elements "characteristic" of gunshot residue but not "unique." A 
finding of "unique" would require the discovery of all three 
substances taken in the gunshot residue test. 
The test samples were also taken from the defendant's 
workplace. The defendant works for a company called "Western 
Battery" where he overhauls generators and alternators. 
"Characteristic" samples of particles were taken from four 
locations at Western Battery, including Mr. Jaeger's wrenches, the 
"vice," the defendant's toolbox and also the "book area." 
Kevin Smith performed tests upon the samples taken at 
"Western Battery" and found one spherical particle to be "unique" 
(i.e. wherein all three elements~were~found) and a limited number 
of spherical particles to be "characteristic" (i.e. where two of 
three elements were found) of gunshot residue. The defendant, 
therefore, at the time of the shooting was working in an 
environment where particles characteristic and unique of gunshot 
residue were prevalent. 
James Gaskill, an Assistant Professor at Weber State College 
Crime Lab, testified. He stated that it would take only two 
pounds of pressure to pull the trigger on the firearm. The 
firearm was characterized as having a "hair trigger.11 Professor 
Gaskill also tested the level of gunshot residue coming onto the 
hands of the shooter of the firearm. Gunshot residue tests were 
performed on the hands of persons firing the .22 caliber pistol 
with the same ammunition used in the fatal shot. The tests were 
performed with holding the gun in the right hand pulling the 
trigger with the right index finger. Particles "unique" to 
gunshot residue were found on the hand of each person shooting the 
pistol. 
Professor Gaskill also indicated that the gun is a relatively 
"clean gun" meaning that it did not exude very much gunshot 
residue when compared with other handguns. He indicated that 
semi-automatic firearms have fewer openings than revolvers and 
given the fact that the firearm in this case is a .22 caliber 
firearm, that not much gunshot residue would exude from the 
firearm when it was fired. 
No evidence of fingerprint testing of the gun was presented 
at the preliminary hearing to assist the court in determining who 
fired the fatal shot. 
LEGAL STANDARD TO APPLY AT A PRELIMINARY HEARING 
Rule 7 (8) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governs 
preliminary hearings. That rule requires that a magistrate must 
find "probable cause to believe that the crime charged has been 
committed and that the defendant has committed it," The Utah 
Supreme Court has defined "probable cause" for purposes of 
preliminary hearings in the case of State v. Anderson. 612 P.2d 
778 (Utah 1980). In Anderson, the court stated "...the probable 
cause showing at the preliminary examination must establish a 
prima facie case against the defendant from which the trier of 
fact could conclude the defendant was guilty of the offense as 
charged." The court cited with approval a Massachusetts case, 
Mvers v. Commonwealth. 363 Mass. 843, 298 N.E. 2d 819 (1973) 
wherein the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted a 
"directed verdict" rule in defining the minimum quantum of 
evidence necessary to fulfill the probable cause requirement at 
the preliminary examination. The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts stated "the magistrate should dismiss the complaint 
when, on the evidence presented, the trial court would be bound to 
acquit as a matter of law." 
The Anderson case also contains the following language "the 
prosecution is not required to introduce enough evidence to 
establish the defendants guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but must 
present a quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant submission of 
the case to the trier of fact." Footnote 13 of that opinion 
states that probable cause at a preliminary hearing is a higher 
standard of "probable cause" than the "probable cause" for 
arrest. The Supreme Court reasoned, "thus, the minimum quantum of 
evidence is more than required to establish probable cause for 
arrest but less than would prove the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Id, at 783. The Anderson case has also been 
cited with approval by the Utah Supreme Court in subsequent 
opinions dealing with preliminary hearings, see State v. Easthope. 
668 P.2d 528 (Utah 1983) and State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 
1986). 
ANALYSIS 
At final argument of this case, the prosecution and defense 
argued that the prosecution's case really hinged on the results of 
the gunshot residue tests. Without the gunshot residue test 
results, the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to link 
the defendant to the second degree murder charge. 
The court is of the opinion that the gunshot residue tests in 
this case are not reliable to provide that critical linkage. Of 
great significance, is the fact that the prosecution has tested 
the defendant's workplace and found one particle "unique" as well 
as many particle "characteristic" of gunshot residue. The 
defendant was regularly employed in an environment in which 
particles "unique" and "characteristic" of gunshot residue are 
prevalent. It is very conceivable that the defendant's hands had 
particles "characteristic" of gunshot residue when tested by law 
enforcement officers a few hours after work. He works day after 
day in an environment where these particles are prevalent. No 
evidence was presented to indicate that the workplace particles 
would not be found on the defendant's hands a few hours after work. 
Another fact of significance is that both of the defendant's 
hands were tested and had particles "characteristic" of gunshot 
residue upon them. Did the defendant shoot the gun by holding it 
with both hands? It seems highly unlikely that the particles 
could be found on both the defendant's hands and could have come 
from the .22 caliber pistol. The gun is not particularly large or 
heavy and one which a person of the size and stature of the 
defendant clearly would have no trouble holding, aiming and 
shooting. The .22 caliber gun was also a relatively "clean gun" 
exuding comparatively little gunshot residue. No one testified 
about the possibility of the defendant shooting the gun with one 
hand and particles "characteristic" of residue landing on the 
other hand. Furthermore, if the defendant really shot the gun, 
why were only particles "characteristic" and not "unique" found on 
his hands? When Professor Gaskill tested the firing of the same 
gun with the same ammunition, he found particles "unique" to 
gunshot residue. Finally, the most prevalent particles found at 
the defendant's place of employment were also "characteristic" 
particles. 
For the above reasons, the court finds that a reasonable jury 
could not link the defendant to the charge with the gunshot 
residue test results. They do not establish the probable cause 
necessary to link the defendant to the commission of the offense. 
The prosecution points out that Mary had no gunshot residue 
on her hands when tested. The argument is that if she 
self-inflicted the gunshot, she would have had residue on her 
bands. In this case, she had none. However, Kevin Smith 
testified that he did not analyze all of the particles taken from 
Mary's hands and therefore it was possible that Mary had gunshot 
residue on her hands. He also stated that a lack of gunshot 
residue should not be conclusive that Mary did not fire the gun. 
The defense also persuasively argues that Mary's hand did not 
have gunshot residue when tested because it may have been nibbed 
off in the hustle of the care that she received after she was 
discovered with a gunshot wound. The defendant was told by the 
911 dispatcher to hold her hand and to turn her over. Mary's 
upper clothing was removed—presumably robbing against her hands 
and removing residue. A bag was placed and taped over each hand 
and later removed at the hospital (unfortunately the bags were 
not preserved by law enforcement to test for gunshot residue that 
may have been displaced from the hands and still found within the 
bags). Mary's hands were moving about as she was taken on the 
stretcher from the home while her hands were still in the bags. 
Numerous persons were working upon and around Mary at the 
hospital. The scene was hectic as medical personnel attempted to 
preserve her life. Mary's left chest was cut, tubes placed into 
her chest and I.V.'s administered. Blood also was on her hands. 
Given these facts, it is very conceivable that any gunshot residue 
from a relatively "clean gun" found on her hands would rub off or 
be obliterated. 
Nor is the court persuaded that the gun, if fired by Mary, 
would exude a sufficient amount of gunshot residue on her hands to 
be detectable. The gun is a relatively "clean gun" exuding 
comparatively little gunshot residue. It is true that test 
firings were performed under the direction of Professor Gaskill, 
showing a discharge of gunshot residue. But these tests were 
presumably conducted with a person holding the .22 caliber gun 
with the right hand holding the pistol in a normal manner—with 
the heel of the gun held with the right hand and pulling the 
trigger with the right index finger. The shell would expend to 
the right through the exit chamber and presumably most of the 
gunshot residue would also be expelled through the exit chamber to 
the right of the gun. There was no testimony of gunshot residue 
tests performed consistent with the defense theory that the gun 
was held in Mary's right hand and pointed backwards and fired 
using her right thumb. In essence, the gun was held by her right 
hand but on the left side of the gun—away from the exit chamber 
which expels the cartridge to the right and presumably also 
expels most of the gunshot residue. The reason this test was not 
performed is obvious to the court. However, appropriate testing 
perhaps could have been performed in a safe manner. Regardless, 
the evidence is not before the court and yet for the above 
reasoning, the court doubts that the gun, if fired by Mary, would 
exude a sufficient amount of gunshot residue to be easily 
detectable on her hands, especially after receiving all of the 
care and treatment which she received as described in the 
preceding paragraph. 
One of the defendant's first comments made to the 911 
operator is consistent with the prosecution's case. The defendant 
stated "Oh...1...1...my girlfriend just shot herself." It could 
be considered, although not argued as such by the prosecution, 
that this statement was the beginning of an admission changed in 
mid-course by the defendant. The statement, however, obviously 
cannot provide the linkage of the defendant to the murder charge. 
It was made in the confusion and excitement at the very beginning 
of the 911 call. It is not an admission and is consistent with 
many other emotional, excited utterances made by the defendant 
while on the telephone line with the 911 operator. These 
emotional, excited utterances are consistent with the defense 
theory that Mary self-inflicted the gunshot wound. The defendant 
stated, "Oh God, I can't believe she done this." (sic) and "I 
can't calm down but my girlfriend just shot herself." and, in 
speaking directly to Mary, "How could you do this?" 
The prosecution also points to the fact that when Mary was 
shot, her left arm was raised at least to shoulder level in a 
natural reaction to protect herself from the gunshot. However, 
the court has viewed the evidence demonstrated by the mannequin 
and determines that there would be no reason for Mary to raise her 
left arm to protect herself from the gunshot. The gun would have 
been held by the defendant in a position too low and too close to 
Mary's chest for Mary to raise her left arm above shoulder height 
in any meaningful self defense. 
However, the left arm being raised by Mary is more consistent 
with a person who is self-inflicting a gunshot and chooses to 
cover her eyes with her left hand rather than literally look down 
the barrel of the gun as it was pointed at her chest, neck or 
facial area. 
Furthermore, the closeness of the gun when it was shot is an 
important factor. Nine inches away from Mary is clearly within 
Mary's 26 1/2 inch arms reach. It would seem that if Mary were to 
be shot by the defendant that she would be shot at a distance out 
of her arms reach. 
Another factor to consider is the trajectory of the shot 
itself. The trajectory is very consistent with Mary holding the 
gun up at herself with her right hand and pulling the trigger with 
her right thumb. The trajectory compared with the closeness of 
the shot and Mary's elevated left arm is not consistent with the 
prosecution's theory that the defendant held the gun and fired the 
fatal shot. 
Another factor is the location of the gun itself when the 
police arrived at the home. It was found on the floor between 
Mary's legs—exactly where one would expect it to be found if the 
gunshot were self-inflicted. Furthermore, the officers observed 
no evidence of any struggle when they were inside the home. 
There is ample motive for Mary to have taken her own life. 
She was distraught. She was crying and upset. She had just been 
informed that she would have to leave the residence of Donald 
Jaeger the next day and not continue to reside with him. Where 
would she live? Under what circumstances would she live and with 
whom? She was under the influence of alcohol and Valium. Earlier 
in the evening she had temporarily abandoned her daughter at the 
home unsupervised. She had been confronted with making long 
distance phone calls to places and to people unknown and not 
approved by Donald Jaeger. She spoke to her mother on the 
telephone about her many problems and her troubled life and 
expressed a desire to get away from things. The combination of 
these emotions and chemicals could very well have prompted Mary to 
take her own life. Of significance, is the first comment made by 
Mary's mother, Judy Clark, when informed that Mary had died. She 
asked if Mary had taken her own life. 
On the other hand, is there a motive for the defendant to 
kill Mary? It is true that this case is in a domestic environment 
where strong and sometimes unpredictable emotions may exist. It 
is true that Mary made unauthorized phone calls, abandoned her 
daughter at the defendants home unsupervised and had been at a bar 
or a party that evening. She came home late with alcohol and 
Valium in her system. The relationship was over. When 
relationships end, people are often excited and do not restrain 
their anger and frustration. But was the defendant this type of 
person? Was he excited and did he fail to restrain his anger and 
frustration? It is significant to the court that, in spite of all 
that had happened and after the defendant had informed Mary that 
the relationship was over, Donald Jaeger telephoned Maryfs mother, 
Judy Clark. He said that Mary needed to talk to her and then gave 
Mary the phone. This does not appear to be the conduct of a 
person who would within minutes take Mary's life. 
It is true that the opinion of the Assistant State Medical 
Examiner was that Mary's death was a homicide. However, his 
opinion was grounded on the discredited gunshot residue tests and 
he did not consider any factors of a possible suicide. For these 
important reasons and other, the court is not persuaded by the 
opinion of the Assistant State Medical Examiner. 
CONCLUSION 
The court has taken this case under advisement for over a 
three week period of time. The court has reviewed the tapes of 
the trial on many occasions as well as the 911 tape. The court 
has examined the physical evidence that was admitted at trial 
including the mannequin, the firearm, the photographs, and the 
gunshot residue test packets. This case is certainly one of the 
most difficult cases that the court has been assigned to decide 
during an eight year tenure on the bench. The court has given 
this case an extensive amount of careful thought and consideration. 
The case is a circumstantial evidence case with major 
weaknesses. The facts just do not add up to the second degree 
murder charge against the defendant. The legal standard 
articulated by our Supreme Court is a higher standard of probable 
cause than the probable cause associated with arrest. There is 
not a sufficient quantum of evidence presented to submit this 
case to a judge or jury. It is the finding of this court that if 
a trial court were presented with this case that it would be bound 
to acquit the defendant as a matter of law. Could a reasonable 
jury find the defendant guilty of the homicide charge? This 
court's honest evaluation of that question is negative—no 
reasonable jury given the facts of this case before the court 
could find the defendant guilty of second degree murder. The 
court concludes that the requisite probable cause necessary for a 
bindover at a preliminary hearing is lacking. The case is 
dismissed against the defendant and he is discharged. 
Dated this 1st day of February, 1991. 
Michael L. Hutchings^ 
Third Circuit Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that I hand delivered a copy of the foregoing 
Memorandum Decision in the above entitled case to the Salt Lake 
County Attorneyfs Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 and the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Office, 430 East 500 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on this 1st day of February, 
1991. 
